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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of the divorce law liberalization of the early 1970s on the increase 
in divorce rates during the same time period. A review of the evidence suggests that the law 
changes were not a major driver of the divorce rates; but the policy changes appear to have af-
fected behavior even for those who did not divorce. The results here suggest that as they saw the 
laws changing, young women in the divorce reform states redirected some of their investments 
from marriage to their own human capital. The perceived increase in the probability of divorce 
motivated women to improve their options outside of marriage. 
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1. Introduction 
Marriage has been a bedrock of American life; but in the past 50 years divorce has come to rival it as a social 
institution that will shape many families. Today the marriage rate in the U.S. is 6.8 marriages per 1000 popula-
tion (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2011), a historical low, and the divorce rate is 16.4 divorces per 1000 married 
women (Wilcox & Marquardt, 2011). 
Despite the decline in the marriage rate, Americans still highly value marriage. Marriage is a more prevalent 
and powerful social norm in the U.S. compared with many Western European countries (Cherlin, 2005). Second 
(and higher order) marriages after divorce are common (Furstenberg, 1994). The attachment to marriage is ex-
emplified by the nationwide battle to obtain legal standing and public support for same-sex couples to marry, 
which very recently culminated in a Supreme Court decision stating that marriage is a constitutional right re-
gardless of gender categories (Liptak, 2015). Nevertheless, on average, Americans are marrying later and 
spending less of their lifetimes married (Furstenberg, 1994), and as is well known about half of all marriages are 
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expected to end in divorce (Castro Martin & Bumpass, 1989). 
The effect of the attenuation of marriage and the proliferation of divorce on individuals and on society as a 
whole has been widely debated in public discussion of American life.1 Psychologists and other social scientists 
agree broadly that divorce is most often painful and traumatic for the families involved (cf. Amato, 2010; Wal-
lerstein & Kelly, 1992). Both quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that the economic circumstances of 
families decline at the time of divorce, particularly for women and children (e.g., Kurz, 1995: Chapters 4 & 5; 
Page & Stevens, 2004). Divorced adults tend to have more physical and mental health ailments and lower life 
expectancies on average relative to married adults (Waite, 1995). On the other hand, many scholars argue that 
most adults recover emotionally from divorce in time and that some blossom in their new life circumstances 
(Hetherington, 2002).  
Researchers differ also on the depth, breadth and duration of the harm suffered by children who have expe-
rienced their parents’ divorce (e.g., Hetherington, 2002; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1992). Children of divorced par-
ents are more likely to drop out of school and have trouble finding a job, and daughters of these families are 
more likely to give birth as a teenager relative to children of parents who stay married (e.g., McLanahan & San-
defur, 1994). Qualitative evidence documents the sadness of many children surrounding the divorce event which 
sometimes continues into adulthood (Marquardt, 2005; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1992). It is generally agreed that 
children benefit when a very high-conflict or abusive marriage ends. But controversy surrounds the question of 
just how bad a marriage has to be for a divorce to be better for the child relative to continuing the marriage 
(Parke, 2003; Wilcox, 2009). Advocates of the traditional marriage ideal argue that the benefit of ending a mar-
riage that is only “unsatisfactory” to a spouse is outweighed by damage to the children. Scholars and policy-
makers with the opposing view emphasize that most children of divorced parents grow up without serious prob-
lems (Parke, 2003).  
Some social critics including psychologists have gone beyond studying individual families to attributing to 
the rise in divorce, the initiation of an unrelenting decline of the American family (e.g., Popenoe, 1993; Wilcox, 
2009). A striking aspect of this argument is that fifty years later, the change to a no-fault divorce regime in the 
U.S., circa 1965, is still blamed as the fulcrum that increased divorce rates and began the erosion of the family 
which they hold continues to the present day (Vitz, 1998; Wilcox, 2009). 
In this paper I briefly review the theoretical and empirical evidence on whether divorce law liberalization in-
creased the divorce rate. This question has been studied from many different points of view and fields of exper-
tise. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the divorce law changes had a fleeting effect, if any, on divorce 
rates. I then address how the Divorce Revolution might have affected the family via a different channel: 
prompting an increase in women’s labor supply. I find evidence that the perception of an increased probability 
of divorce most likely reallocated some of women’s investments in their marriages to investments in their own 
human capital. Women’s ability to support themselves and their children has soared since 1965. Women’s in-
creased labor supply unquestionably has affected the framework of the family; but I would argue that the in-
crease in women’s autonomy has been an overall gain that has strengthened many families regardless of their 
composition. 
Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic increase in the American divorce rate which began around 1965 and did not 
level off until 1981. The rate has declined slowly since then but has not returned to 1950s levels.2 The steepest rise 
was between 1965 and 1975, when the divorce rate doubled from 10.6 to 20.3 divorces per 1000 married women. 
This upsurge largely coincided with the broad divorce reform of this time period: the liberalization of divorce 
laws in a large number of states to a unilateral regime, which made divorce easier by requiring the consent of 
only one spouse to dissolve a marriage (e.g., Friedberg, 1998; Weitzman, 1985). Table 1 shows the year of the 
switch to a unilateral law for each reform state; the vast majority changed their laws between 1965 and 1975.3 
This divorce law liberalization was termed the “Divorce Revolution” by sociologist Lenore Weitzman (1985). 
The phrase has come to describe also the precipitous rise in the divorce rate, and a wider social phenomenon, the 
onset of a “divorce culture” replacing the older “marriage culture” (Council on Families in America, 1995; 
Whitehead, 1997). It is this Divorce Revolution that many social critics believe instigated a general decline in 
 
 
1e.g. Coontz, 2013; Council on Families in America, 1995; Hochschild, 2002; Whitehead, 1997. 
2The divorce rate began a slow rise from near-zero levels around the time of the Civil War. In the early 20th century the rate surged after both 
of the World Wars, and plummeted during the Depression (Cherlin, 1992: p. 21). But the 1950s levels are in line with the gently rising trend 
line from the 1860s (Cherlin, 1992: Figure 1-5). 
3The “no-change” states listed in Table 1 eventually liberalized their divorce laws long after 1981 when the divorce rate began to fall. 
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Figure 1. Divorce rate. Source: Clarke, 1995; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001; Wilcox & Marquardt, 2011.                                                      
 
Table 1. States’ changes to unilateral divorce.                                                                                  
States Which Never Changed State and Year Changed to Unilateral Divorce 
State State Year State Year 
Arkansas New Mexico 1933 Kentucky 1972 
District of Columbia Alaska 1935 Michigan 1972 
Illinois Oklahoma 1953 Nebraska 1972 
Louisiana Nevada 1967 Arizona 1973 
Maryland Delaware 1968 Connecticut 1973 
Mississippi Kansas 1969 Georgia 1973 
Missouri California 1970 Indiana 1973 
New Jersey Iowa 1970 Maine 1973 
New York Texas 1970 Montana 1973 
North Carolina Alabama 1971 Washington 1973 
Ohio Florida 1971 Minnesota 1974 
Pennsylvania Idaho 1971 Massachusetts 1975 
South Carolina New Hampshire 1971 Rhode Island 1975 
Tennessee North Dakota 1971 Wyoming 1977 
Vermont Oregon 1971 Wisconsin 1978 
Virginia Colorado 1972 South Dakota 1985 
West Virginia Hawaii 1972 Utah 1987 
Notes: Adapted from Gruber (2004) Table 1. 
 
the American family (e.g., Kirkwood, 1996; Parkman, 1993), and to which they point when advocating making 
divorce more difficult—that is, returning to a 50-year-old legal system. 
2. The Effects of Divorce Law Liberalization 
The zero-order question in assessing the impact of the Divorce Revolution (by which I mean solely the change 
in the laws) is whether it had a causal effect on the divorce rate increase. Although it is prima facie intuitive that 
making divorce easier increased the incidence of divorce, the causality question has generated much discussion 
among researchers in economics, sociology, and the law.4 Two types of law changes constituted divorce law 
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4See Glenn, 1997; Nakonezny et al., 1995; Rodgers et al., 1999; Brinig & Buckley, 1998; Ellman, 2000; Ellman & Lohr, 1998. 
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reform. The change from “fault” to “no-fault” substituted “irreconcilable differences” as a legal basis for divorce 
in place of grounds such as adultery or cruelty, which previously required formal proof and often resulted in 
perjury and collusion between spouses in order to obtain a legal divorce (Riley, 1991; Weitzman, 1985). The 
second, often overlapping, change was from the requirement that both spouses agree to divorce (mutual-consent) 
to only one (unilateral). Legal scholars have argued that the law changes were carried out “with little visibility or 
prominence” (Jacob, 1988: p. 15), by lawmakers and legal experts who wished to remove the unnecessarily ad-
versarial elements from the proceedings and who felt the dignity of the law suffered from the machinations of 
judges, lawyers, and spouses to prove the often fabricated grounds (e.g., Freed & Foster, 1979; Riley, 1991; 
Sepler, 1981). A number of scholars have therefore argued that the law changes were exogenous to the lives of 
those affected (e.g., Friedberg, 1998; Gruber, 2004; Wolfers, 2006). 
Economists have focused on the transition from mutual-consent to unilateral laws in assessing causation be-
tween divorce law reform and divorce rates, because of the intriguing implications of the Coase theorem for this 
relationship (Coase, 1960; Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977). Assuming spouses can bargain costlessly, only 
efficient divorces will occur, those for which the total value of the marriage is less than the sum of the spouses’ 
opportunities outside of marriage. The change to a unilateral divorce law changes assigned “property rights”-that 
is, who possesses the decision-making power over whether to divorce or not divorce. If spouses can easily bar-
gain, who owns the property right will not change the incidence of divorce but can change the compensation 
schemes spouses devise which ensure these efficient outcomes. Within marriage, these schemes govern how 
spouses divide their time between market work, home production, and leisure. In the case of divorce, ownership 
of the property right dictates who will pay and who will profit from the divorce. Peters (1986) considered this 
model in depth and found that the divorce law regime was unrelated to divorce rates, but that the unilateral re-
gime was associated with lower settlements for women, a result consistent with the idea that husbands who 
wished to leave marriages could decrease compensation to their wives under unilateral regimes relative to mu-
tual consent. Weitzman (1985) provided anecdotal evidence that longtime housewives suffered from the switch 
to the unilateral regime because they had little leverage to claim part of the marital property. 
Peters and other scholars have explored theoretical conditions under which the Coase theorem would not ap-
ply and divorce law reform would change divorce rates (Chiappori, Iyigun, & Weiss, 2007; Mechoulan, 2005, 
2006; Rasul, 2006). Debate continues on the empirical side as well. Allen (1992) disputed Peters’ results, find-
ing that the divorce law change did increase divorce rates. Friedberg (1998) using longitudinal data found strong 
effects of divorce law reform, but Wolfers (2006) argues that the effect was transitory.  
Regarding the zero-order question, the evidence suggests any direct increase in the divorce rate from the di-
vorce law changes was small. So it appears turning back the clock to make divorce more difficult would do little 
to push the American family back into its traditional box (cf. Furstenberg, 1994).  
But even if a particular individual did not divorce as a result of the divorce law reform, an increase in the 
perceived risk of divorce potentially changed her behavior even if the effect on divorce rates was not long term. 
A reduction in expected marriage duration reduces the value of specialization and marriage-specific investments. 
This may be particularly important for women because their human capital acquisition is traditionally more fo-
cused on marriage-specific home production skills whose value may be dissipated when a marriage dissolves, 
whereas the value of market skills, held by men in greater proportion, may be more transferable to the single 
state. The reassignment of the right to divorce also shifts bargaining power from the spouse who most values the 
marriage to the spouse most interested in divorce. Divorce law reform may then precipitate behavioral changes, 
with “weaker” spouses accommodating the stronger spouse’s preferences or attempting to maintain bargaining 
power by improving their outside options-through increasing market work, for example. Attachment to marriage 
will vary over individuals, but it is likely that the spouse with fewer options is often the wife, since women’s 
economic circumstances decline on average after divorce (e.g., Duncan & Hoffmann, 1985) and they are likely 
to bear more of the subsequent childrearing costs (Weitzman, 1985). 
Female labor force participation is rising at the same time as the divorce rate, but Figure 2 shows that the di-
vorce rate does not track with the long steady rise of labor force participation (which began about 1900 (Goldin, 
2000)). 
The response of women’s labor supply to divorce risk and to changes in divorce law has already received 
attention in the literature. Johnson and Skinner (1986) find that married women increase their labor supply prior 
to a divorce, and argue that the increase results from the anticipation of divorce, rather than precipitating the di-
vorce. Cross-sectional results often show a positive association between divorce law reform and women’s labor 
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Figure 2. Divorce rates and female labor force participation. Sources: Clarke, 1995; U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, 2014; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975; Wilcox & Marquardt, 2011.                                      
 
supply, while longitudinal results are more mixed.5 Genadek, Stock and Stoddard (2007) argue that differing re-
sults could be explained by heterogeneous impacts of divorce law changes, if women have different costs of 
bargaining and divorce. They find that divorce law reform increases the labor supply of married mothers, espe-
cially those with young children, relative to other women for whom divorce is likely to be less costly. 
The probability of divorce decreases with a person’s age and with the duration of a marriage (e.g., Clarke, 
1995), so the shock of a divorce law change may have had different effects on couples in more or less stable pe-
riods in the marriage cycle. In addition, the impact of a law change could depend in other ways on the life stage 
of the individual when the law change occurs: young women may have greater scope than older women to 
change their education paths, career investments, and other life choices when they see the terms of the marriage 
contract changing around them. So it is useful to look at women by age cohort as in Figure 3. 
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1963 to 1999 to compare graphically the labor 
force participation (LFP) of women aged 15 - 62 in states which liberalized their laws and in those which never 
changed their laws. The CPS is a large, nationally representative household survey with comparable information 
for women in each year over this time period.6 The data are a repeated series of cross-sections so individuals 
cannot be tracked longitudinally. However, “synthetic cohorts” can be tracked over long periods of time (e.g., 
Lleras-Muney, 2005). We form a synthetic cohort by linking women of age a in survey wave t to women of age 
a + 1 in wave t + 1, and so on. Then the average characteristics of this cohort over time are representative of the 
characteristics of an individual woman followed over the same time period. In Figure 3, cohort profiles are 
plotted by grouping women observed in each calendar year by their birth years (here in 10-year spans), calculat-
ing their average participation rate in that year, and linking these rates from year to year. Following cohorts al-
lows disentangling life-cycle (or age) effects from generational (or cohort) differences. Each profile-pairing of a 
solid and a dashed line represents the experience of a cohort as it ages, where the age denoted on the x-axis is 
the midpoint of the age range for the cohort in any given survey year. The oldest cohort shown was born be-
tween 1915 and 1924, the profile on the lower right, and the youngest was born between 1955 and 1964, on the 
upper left.  
Most striking in the figure is the across-cohort increase in women’s LFP-each profile is higher at any given 
age as we look from the lower right to the upper left, that is, from older to younger cohorts. The second notable 
difference, within cohorts, is in the effects of living in states which changed their laws, represented by the solid 
line for each cohort, versus in no-change states, represented by the dashed line. First consider the middle profile, 
for the cohort born 1935-44. Since we first observe these women in 1963 (at ages 19 - 28), the first twelve years 
of their profile covers the most active period of divorce law liberalization, through 1975. At the beginning of 
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
# 
di
vo
rc
es
 p
er
 1
,0
00
 m
ar
rie
d 
w
om
en
%
 w
om
en
 a
ge
 1
5+
 in
 la
bo
r f
or
ce
FLFP divorce rate
               
 
 
5Chiappori, Fortin, & Lacroix, 2002; Parkman, 1993; Peters, 1986, 1992; Gray, 1986; Stevenson, 2008. 
6For the periods 1968-72 and 1973-76, some states were not individually coded in the CPS, but were put into regional groupings which dif-
fered between these two time periods. States that are in homogenous groups (all law-changing states or all no-change states) are included in 
the data, but states in heterogeneous groupings in a time period are excluded for those years. 
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Figure 3. Women’s labor force participation by ten-year age cohorts. Author’s calculations, March 
CPS 1963-1999, women age 15 - 62.                                                                 
 
this period, the LFP rate in the “never” states is greater, but the rate in the law-changing states overtakes it and is 
statistically significantly greater for ages 31 - 47. This is suggestive that the law changes were associated with 
increased LFP by women, as they saw the likelihood of divorce spike for their cohort with the law changes. 
Contrast this with the older cohorts, born 1915-24 and 1925-34: again the first twelve years of the profile covers 
the liberalization period, but for these two cohorts there is no notable difference between the two lines. It seems 
likely that the law changes had little effect on LFP for these older cohorts for two reasons: with longer-lived and 
more stable marriages, the change in the risk of divorce was not as great, and their work options were likely 
more limited than those of younger women. For the 1945-54 cohort, the second youngest in the figure, the first 
twelve years of the profile show little difference for women in the two types of states. Around age 25, however, 
LFP for women in the law-changing states surpasses that of women in no-change states, and this difference is 
statistically significant for ages 27 - 42. This is consistent with women in the law-changing states choosing to 
work during their child-bearing ages (cf. Genadek, Stock, & Stoddard, 2007). The youngest cohort, born 
1955-64, comes of working age after the law changes are complete. The LFP for women in the law-changing 
states is higher for most of the years we observe them, significantly so for ages 15 - 31, suggesting that higher 
women’s LFP has become a norm in these states.  
The evidence is suggestive that the law changes had an important effect on the labor supply decisions of 
women who reached their mid-twenties during the divorce law liberalization and shortly thereafter. The effect 
appears to persist, although at a lower level, for the youngest cohort of women, for whom the law changes were 
in place by their midteens. 
3. Conclusion 
The evidence in this study supports the argument that the divorce law changes had powerful unforeseen effects 
(Jacob, 1988; Parkman, 1993) and that the major effects resulted not from the fleetingly increased divorce rates 
but through behavioral changes of those who did not divorce (Gruber, 2004). The evidence is consistent with the 
notion that within families trade-offs were made between marriage-specific investments and individual’s in-
vestments that would be more valuable if the marriage ended (i.e., women’s increasing labor supply). Divorce 
law reform changed the terms of marriage contracts that couples were contemporaneously engaged in without 
consideration of the long term effects on incentives to make these investments. 
Marital status continues to be an important predictor of well-being (Waite, 1995) and the health of the Amer-
ican family is well deserving of attention. However, the argument that divorce law liberalization was a major 
driver of increasing divorce rates is weak; and correspondingly the notion of making divorces more difficult to 
obtain seems unlikely to reverse the plethora of changes in the American family that have occurred over the past 
fifty years. 
The difficult ramifications of divorce are easier to quantify than the benefits. But women’s increased labor 
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force participation has clearly put them on a more equal footing with men both within and outside marriage. I 
would argue that doing more to support the American family in its current forms is likely to be more productive 
than seeking to return to narrow and outdated ideals of family structure. 
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